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In pre-war Japan, many banks were controlled by industrial companies through capital and personal 
relationships. Those banks are known as “organ banks” (kikan ginko). Organ banks engaged in unsound 
lending to their related companies, which resulted in damage to the banks’ financial positions and 
consequently destabilized the financial system. This is a popularly held view of the financial history of 
pre-war Japan (organ bank hypothesis). However, this view has been based largely on case studies and 
casual observations. In this paper we examine the organ bank hypothesis using quantitative data and 
econometric methodology. To measure the extent of connections between banks and non-banking 
companies, we compiled a comprehensive database of directors and auditors of banks and non-banking 
companies in 1926. It was found that interlocking of directors and auditors between banks and 
non-banking companies was very pervasive. More than 80% of ordinary banks had at least one director 
or auditor who was at the same time a director or auditor of at least one non-banking company. Also, 
regression analyses confirmed that director interlocking had a negative effect on bank performance, 
especially  for  smaller  banks.      
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1. Introduction 
It is well known that the financial system in postwar Japan was bank-based, and that it was 
characterized by the “main bank system”.
1  H o w e v e r ,  i n  p r e - w a r  J a p a n ,  a large part of industrial 
investment was financed by equity and, correspondingly, large shareholders played a major role in 
corporate governance.
2  Banks basically were not active in monitoring industrial companies in pre-war 
Japan.    In fact, many banks were controlled by the owners of industrial companies.     
Banks controlled by industrial companies were called “organ banks” (kikan ginko)
3, and have been 
regarded as characterizing the pre-war Japanese financial system.  According to the literature, a typical 
organ bank was established to generate funding for the industrial businesses of the bank founders.  
Therefore, an organ bank was not managed for its own profitability, but rather for the benefit of the 
corporate group with which it was affiliated.  Consequently, organ banks tended to advance a large 
amount of loans to a small number of industrial companies connected with the bank founders.
4  
Furthermore, many researchers have pointed out that organ banks engaged in unsound lending to their 
related companies without diversifying the portfolios, which damaged the banks’ financial positions, and 
destabilized the financial system. This view has become well established in today’s literature on Japanese 
financial history.  And, some regard the organ bank relationship as a basic cause of the 1927 Showa 
Financial Crisis.
5 
On the other hand, recent literature in the field of banking and finance has made it clear that this 
kind of bank-firm relationship (“related lending”) can be widely observed in today’s developing 
                              
1  Aoki, Sheard, and Patrick, “Main Bank”; Hoshi and Kashap, Corporate Financing.    
2 Hoshi  and Kashap, Corporate Financing; Okazaki,Corporate Governance; Okazaki, Mochikabu; 
Okazaki, “The Role ”.   
3  “Kikan ginko” was translated into “organ bank” in Hoshi and Kashyap,Corporate Financing ,while 
it was translated into “institution bank” in Teranishi, “The Main Bank”. 
4 Kato, Honpo Ginkoshi Ron ; Murakami, “Futsu Ginko” . 
5  Teranishi, “The Fall ”; Takahashi and Morigaki, Showa Kin’yu Kyoko; Yamazaki, Showa Kin’yu 
Kyoko.   3
countries.
6  Furthermore, “insider lending” was also prevalent in the U.S. in the nineteenth century.
7  
This suggests that the organ bank relationship in pre-war Japan was symptomatic of the pattern of 
financial relationships in underdeveloped financial markets.  Investigating the organ bank relationship 
can contribute not only to understanding Japanese financial history, but also to a broader examination of 
comparative financial systems and comparative financial history.
8  
 An extensive body of literature on the organ bank relationship has been published since Kato’s 
seminal work.
9  However, this research is based on case studies of a small number of banks, and there 
has been no literature that analyses the organ bank relationship quantitatively.  In fact, we do not even 
have such basic data as how pervasive the close bank-firm relationship was in pre-war Japan, for the very 
good reason that this information is difficult to find.    In this paper, we use a newly compiled database of 
directors and auditors of banks and non-banking companies in 1926 to identify bank-firm relationships 
through the “interlocking” of directors and auditors.  Then, using the interlocking variable, we 
quantitatively examine the effect of director interlocking on bank performance.     
The paper is organized as follows:  In Section 2, the historical background is summarized.  In 
Section 3, we describe the database of directors and auditors, and present basic findings derived from this 
database.  Section 4 presents econometric analyses of the influence of the interlocking of directors and 
auditors on bank performance. Section 5 concludes the paper.   
 
2. A Brief Historical Background 
                              
6  La Porta, Rafel, Lopez-Silanes, and Zamarrip, “Related Lending”; Beim and Calomiris, Emerging 
Financial Markets.  
7 Lamoreaux,  Insider Lending.     
8  Allen and Gale, Comparing Financial systems; Calomiris, U.S. Bank Dereguration; La Porta, “Legal 
Determinants” 
9 Kato, Honpo Ginkoshi Ron; Imuta, “Shohyo”; Sugiyama, “Gomeigaisha Mitsui ”;Ishii, “Hyaku Sanju 
Ginko ”.   4
The modern history of the banking industry in Japan started with the National Bank Act in 1872.  
The national banks were private banks that were granted the privilege of issuing banknotes.  After 
revision of the Act in 1876, which suspended the convertibility of national banknotes, the number of 
national banks grew rapidly to reach 153, the upper limit prescribed by the National Bank Act, in 1879.   
In 1882, the Bank of Japan (BOJ) was established as the central bank, and in 1885 it began to issue bank 
notes convertible to silver, resulting in a further revision to the National Bank Act, which obliged national 
banks to convert into ordinary banks within twenty years of establishment.
10  
Enactment of the 1893 Bank Act as the legislative framework for ordinary banks brought about a 
rapid increase in their number.  In 1901, the number of ordinary banks approached the peak of 1890.
11  
These ordinary banks had the following notable characteristics: Although deposits into ordinary banks 
grew rapidly, the ratio of banks’ equity to deposits remained high until the early twentieth century.  In 
1901, equity accounted for 36% of the total liabilities of ordinary banks.
12  Also, at the beginning of the 
twentieth century, ordinary banks depended heavily on borrowings from the BOJ.
13  In this sense, the 
ordinary banks differed from that of the typical modern bank based on deposits.     
The ratio of deposits to total bank liabilities increased in the 1900s. This was primarily due to a 
change in the BOJ policy.  Until 1897, the BOJ was open-handed in lending to private banks, and the 
banks earned substantial profits from the interest rate spread between borrowings from the BOJ and loans 
to non-banking companies. However, in 1897 the BOJ initiated direct lending to non-banking companies, 
in order to prevent banks from earning profits from the interest rate spread.
14  This policy change was 
aimed at pressuring banks to decrease their borrowings from the BOJ, and to focus on attracting deposits. 
                              
10 Asakura,  Shinpen Nihon Kin’yu Shi, pp.36-37; Teranishi, Nihon no Keizai Hatten, p.35-37. 
11 Goto,  Goto,  Kin’yu Tokei, p.56. 
12  Calculated from the data in Goto, Kin’yu Tokei, p.86-87. 
13  Ishii, “Hyaku Sanju Ginko ”. 
14 Bank  of  Japan.  Nihon Ginko Hyakunen Shi.     5
At the same time, the number of ordinary banks began declining, due to bank failures and mergers.   
In the 1910s, the First World War had a substantial impact on the banking sector, and on the 
Japanese economy as a whole. Deposits increased rapidly, due to economic growth and an expansionary 
monetary policy.  Consequently, the average equity-liability ratio of ordinary banks fell below 20%.  
And ordinary banks began resembling typical modern banks, at least in terms of the composition of 
liabilities. Meanwhile, during the War boom, many ordinary banks advanced large amounts to industrial 
companies, especially those in the heavy and chemical industries. In many cases, these companies faced 
difficulties when the War ended and international competition revived, which in turn led to a 
considerable number of bank loans becoming non-performing.  Because the equity-liabilities ratio of 
banks had substantially declined during the 1910s, the deterioration of banks’ assets seriously damaged 
their financial positions.    This was the fundamental cause of the instability of the financial system in the 
1920s. 
The bank panic of 1920 saw many banks, particularly smaller ones, close down. In order to secure 
stability of the financial market, the government initiated an organizational reform of the banking sector 
in the early 1920s, imposing entry regulations and promoting mergers.
15 The 1923 Great Earthquake in 
Tokyo further destabilized the financial market, because the earthquake, many of the assets that had been 
used as collateral for bank loans, or were expected to generate cash flow to repay the loans, were 
destroyed or burnt. 
In 1926, the government decided to implement fundamental measures to restructure the financial 
system, and proposed two draft bills designed to dispose of the bad loans.  However, the Diet opposed 
these bills on the grounds that they favoured capitalists connected to the government. During the Diet 
                              
15  Goto, Ginko Godo,p.19; Okazaki, “Ginkogyo”.   6
deliberations, the Minister of Finance made a notorious slip of the tongue concerning the closure of 
certain banks, which triggered the Showa Financial Crisis of 1927. This was the largest financial crisis in 
Japanese economic history
16. Forty-five banks closed as a result of runs in 1927. They represented 2.91% 
of all ordinary and savings banks in terms of numbers, and 9.02% in terms of value of deposits. Among 
them were Jugo Bank and the Bank of Taiwan. Jugo Bank was one of the ten largest banks, and the Bank 
of Taiwan was a special bank which was established for developing the Taiwan area in 1899. The 
magnitude of the financial crisis can be indicated by the shift of deposits away from banks to the Postal 
Bureau.  In 1927, while the total outstanding deposits of all banks decreased, Postal Bureau deposits 
increased by 30.1% .
17 
Several studies have suggested that a basic cause of the crisis was the organ bank relationship. 
18 
There had been no effective regulation of either director interlocking or maximum loan exposure to a 
single customer prior to enactment of the Bank Law in 1928.    Hence, non-banking companies were free 
to control certain banks for the purposes of raising funds.
19 Comprehensive data on loans by banks and 
by borrowers are not available, but, the BOJ did record the data of those banks that closed during the 
Showa Financial Crisis. 
With respect to the closed banks, detailed data on the loans are available in the documents of the 
BOJ.  Panel A of Appendix Table 1 shows that most of the closed banks engaged in lending to related 
groups that were connected to the banks through shareholding and/or director interlocking.  Panels B 
and C compare the terms and ex post performances of the related loans and total loans.
20  There was a 
                              
16  See Hoshi and Kashyap, Corporate Financing for details. 
17 Toyo  Keizai  Shinposha,  Kanketsu Showa Kokusei, pp.365,p.401.   
18 Kato, Honpo Ginkoshi ; Takahashi and Morigaki, Showa Kinyu Kyoko; Ishii, “Hyaku Sanju Ginko .” 
19  The Bank Act, enacted in 1893, imposed a regulation that restricted loans and discounts by a bank to a 
single customer to no more than 10% of the bank’s capital. However, due to the objections of bankers and 
industrialists, this regulation was rescinded in 1895 (Patrick , “Japan”). 
20 “All loans minus loans to related borrowers” might not be equal to actual loans to the unrelated   7
larger proportion of unsecured loans among the related loans, and the percentage of unrecoverable loans 
was higher among related loans than among total loans. Thus, at least in respect of the closed banks, 
lending to related groups was likely to be based on some degree of corrupt relationship, beyond proper 
financial judgement.
21  
For a more detailed insight into how and why these banks failed, we looked at two cases, 
Nakazawa Bank and Murai Bank, from BOJ.
22 Nakazawa Bank was established in 1897 by Hikokichi 
Nakazawa. At the end of 1925, the Nakazawa family still owned more than 90% of the bank’s shares. 
When Yoshikazu Nakazawa became the third president of the bank, he was the second largest 
shareholder. At the same time, he was a director of seven non-banking companies owned by him and his 
family.
23  Over 90% of Nakazawa Bank’s loans were made to the Nakazawa group (Panel A of Appendix 
Table 1). However, in the 1920s the businesses of the Nakazawa group got into trouble, and some group 
companies failed as a result of speculative investment in stock.  Nakazawa Bank had no option but to 
continue lending money to the Nakazawa group.  Finally, as the business situation of the Nakazawa 
group steadily worsened, Nakazawa Bank was forced to close during the Showa Financial Crisis of 1927.   
Murai Bank was established in 1904 by the Murai family. At the end of 1926, Murai Bank was still 
wholly owned by the Murai family, which also provided all the bank’s board members. As in the case of 
Nakazawa Bank, the Murai family operated several non-banking businesses, including trading, mining, 
agriculture and real estate enterprises. As a result, the loan portfolio of Murai Bank was skewed toward 
four non-banking companies owned by the Murai family (Panel A of Appendix Table 1).  Despite the 
                                                                                   
borrowers, since we cannot always get the data of loans to all the related borrowers.       
21  Moreover, we can confirm that 13 of the 15 banks in Appendix Table 1 had director interlocking with 
non-banking companies, according to the data of Ginko Kaisha Yoroku. 
22  Bank of Japan. “Sho Kyugyo Ginko”. 
23 BOJ, “Sho Kyugyo” provided no information on the ownership structure of Nakazawa-related 
companies. So, we checked the ownership structure of the four related companies whose business reports 
were available, namely Kinsen Inryo, Sapporo Mokuzai, Taiwan Takushoku and Toshin Gomukogyo. It 
is confirmed that Yoshikazu Nakazawa was the major shareholder in all four companies.         8
Murai Group foundering in the 1920s, Murai Bank continued to lend them money. Eventually, Murai 
Bank was forced to close in 1927, due to a combination of defaults on bad loans to the Murai group 
defaulting, and the Great Earthquake. 
The government perceived that the organ bank relationship was inimical to a sound banking 
system. The Bank Law of 1927 compelled ordinary banks to be registered as joint-stock companies, and 
to be capitalized at not less than one million yen.
24 According to the Bank Law, existing banks whose 
capital was currently below the minimum limit (“unqualified banks”) had to meet the capital criterion 
within seven years. In addition, executive directors and managers of ordinary banks were prohibited from 
engaging in other businesses without the approval of the Minister of Finance.
25    
 
3. Interlocking between Banks and Non-banking Companies 
In pre-war Japan, wealth distribution was far from equal, and there were a number of wealthy 
individuals who were large shareholders of many companies, concurrently.
26  Furthermore, in many 
cases those large shareholders held directorships in the companies in which they invested.
27 The 
ownership and governance structure of banks was part of this picture. Large investors owned shares and 
held directorships in banks as well as industrial companies, as we will see in this section. To put it 
another way, they created business groups that included banks as well as industrial companies.    It is said 
that, in many of these cases, the banks were not managed for their own profitability but rather for the 
primary purpose of generating funding companies within the same group .
28  
                              
24 A bank was required to have capital of at least two million yen in Tokyo and Osaka, and at least 
500,000 yen in towns and villages with populations of less than ten thousand. 
25 Bank  of  Japan,  Nihon Ginko Hyakunen.p.273-274; Shiratori, “1920 Nendai”. 
26  Mizoguchi, “Nihon no Shotoku”; Minami and Ono,“Senzen Nihon”. 
27 Morikawa,  Nihon Keieishi; Miyamoto, “Sangyo”; Okazaki, “Corporate Governance”; Okazaki, 
Mochikabu; Miyamoto and Abe “Kogyoka”. 
28  Bank of Japan. “Sho Kyugyo”; Takahashi, and Morigaki. Showa Kinyu.   9
In this section, we measure the pervasiveness of close bank-firm relationship, in respect of ordinary 
banks. We approached this task by compiling a comprehensive database of directors and auditors of 
banks and non-banking companies in 1926. The data source is Tokyo Koshinjo
29. Tokyo Koshinjo, one 
of the largest private credit bureaus in pre-war Japan, published a directory of corporate directors, Ginko 
Kaisha Youroku, every year from 1897 to 1942.  We used the 1926 edition to identify bank-company 
connections immediately prior to the Showa Financial Crisis of 1927. 
From Tokyo Koshinjo, we have taken the names of the directors and auditors of each bank and 
non-banking firm whose paid-in capital was two hundred thousand yen or more. Conveniently, Tokyo 
Koshinjo includes an index by person.
30  We identified interlocking between banks and non-banking 
companies through the following procedure: If, for example, a person who was a director of a given bank 
was concurrently a director of a particular non-banking company, we identified that as “one interlock”. If 
a director of a given bank was simultaneously a director of two non-banking companies, we classified 
that as “two interlocks”.   
The financial data for each bank are taken from the Ministry of Finance, which covers 1,417 
ordinary banks in Japan, excluding colonies, at the end of 1926.  Complete financial data are available 
for 1,398 of the 1,417 banks.
31    And, the data on directors and auditors are available in Tokyo Koshinjo   
for 1,007 of the 1,398 banks whose capital was not less than two hundred thousand yen. Hereinafter, we 
use these 1,007 banks as our basic sample banks.
3233  
Table 1 shows the distribution of numbers of directors and auditors per bank. The average was 
around 8 (mean = 8.57, median = 8.00).    And more than 80% of the sample banks had between 5 and 11.   
                              
29  Tokyo Koshinjo, Ginko Kaisha Youroku, 1926 issue. 
30  Tokyo Koshinjo, Ginko Kaisha Youroku, 1926 issue. 
31  Ministry of Finance , Ginkokyoku Nenpo, 1926 issue. 
32  Tokyo Koshinjo, Ginko Kaisha Youroku, 1926 issue. 
33  In the following section, we discuss the possibility of selection bias in our data sampling.     10
Table 1 also shows the distribution, in cases where we classified the positions of the directors and 
auditors into four categories, namely 1) top executives (president and chairman), 2) executive directors, 
3) ordinary directors, and 4) auditors.
34   
Panel A of Table 2 summarizes the basic findings on director interlocking between banks and 
non-banking companies. A total 836 banks, comprising 83% of total observations, had at least one 
director or auditor who held at least one position of director or auditor in a non-banking company. The 
average number of interlocking positions per bank was 7.26.    Panel A of Table 2 shows the data broken 
down by position in the non-banking companies, classified into four categories, as in Table 1.  For 
example, banks in which at least one director or auditor had the position of top executive of a 
non-banking company numbered 407, or 40.4% of total observations. 
Panels B to E of Table 2 show the data broken down by position with the bank. In respect of 48% 
of total observations, the top executives of the banks held at least one position of director or auditor of a 
non-banking company, and the average number of interlocks in which the banks’ top executives were 
involved was 1.48. On the other hand, as shown in Panel D, the percentage of banks in which at least one 
ordinary director held a position of director or auditor of a non-banking company was 68.5%, and the 
average number of interlocks of the banks’ ordinary directors was 3.48.  From these results, we can 
safely say that most ordinary banks were connected with non-banking companies through the 
interlocking of directors and auditors.     
Table 3 is a breakdown of Panel A of Table 2 by scale of banks.    We split the 1,007 observations 
into three equal groups in terms of bank assets.  We defined smaller banks as banks in the 0-33.3 
percentile in terms of asset level, medium-sized banks as banks in the 33.3-66.7 percentile, and large 
                              
34  Some companies did not have a president or a chairman.    In these cases, we identified the executive 
director as the top executive.   11
banks as banks in the 66.7-100 percentile. The first point to note is that the interlocking of directors and 
auditors with non-banking companies pervaded all three groups. However, in a relative sense, 
interlocking with non-banking companies was more pervasive among the large banks. This remains true 
when we break down the data by positions with non-banking companies. In all sub-categories of the data, 
both the percentage of banks with interlocking positions and the average number of interlocks were 
greatest in the large banks.
35  
The results from our database are striking, and the facts support the conjecture of Kato on the 
pervasiveness of the organ bank relationship.
36  More than 80% of the ordinary banks were connected to 
non-banking companies through the interlocking of directors and auditors.
37    Moreover, the interlocking 
was more pervasive in the large banks. However, the fact of interlocking does not by itself mean that 
there was an organ bank relationship in the sense discussed in Section 1. It is necessary to examine in 
more detail the nature and influence of the interlocking shown by Table 2 and Table 3.   
For this purpose, we looked first at the cases of the ten banks with the greatest number of interlocks, 
namely Yokohama Koshin Bank (88), Bushu Bank (74), Meiji Bank (67), Yokkaichi Bank (67), Mitsui 
Bank (64), Mitsubishi Bank (60), Shimotsuke Chuo Bank (53), Jugo (49), Yasuda Bank (45), and Joshu 
Bank (43).
38  In seven of the ten banks the presidents were one of the ten largest shareholders of these 
banks. In this sense, management of those banks was not distinct from ownership. Furthermore, in many 
of the cases where bank presidents directed or audited non-banking companies, they were also major 
                              
35  Breaking down the data by position in the bank, we confirmed that the situation was almost the same 
(not reported in table).   
36 Kato, Honpo Ginkoshi Ron.   
37  We also checked the extent of director interlocking among non-banking companies. While the number 
of non-banking companies that had at least one interlocking director with a ordinary bank was 3113, 
Tokyo Koshinjo, Ginko Kaisha covered 9644 non-banking companies. Therefore, 32.2% of non-banking 
companies covered in Tokyo Koshijo, Ginko Kaisha had at least one interlocked director with a ordinary 
bank.   
38  The numbers in parentheses denote the number of interlocks.     12
shareholders of those companies. Therefore, we can say that the interlocking of directors and auditors 
between banks and non-banking companies was based primarily shared common major shareholders.     
This also implies that the nature of director interlocking between banks and non-banking 
companies in pre-war Japan was essentially different from that in the main bank relationship in postwar 
Japan.
39  In postwar Japan, the main bank, not its major shareholders, seconds employees as directors of 
the borrowing companies for the purpose of monitoring their performance. In addition, “contingent 
governance” is a characteristic of corporate governance under the main bank relationship. Contingent 
governance means that the governance of a company is contingent on its financial state. If a company 
runs into financial problems, the main bank initiates management intervention to restructure the bank, by 
seconding directors .
40  Hence, under the postwar main bank system, it is the poor financial position of a 
company that motivates the personal connection with its main bank. The cases of above ten banks 
suggest that this causality was not usual in pre-war Japan, because director interlocking essentially 
reflected the common ownership between the banks and non-banking companies.   
 
4. Influence of Governance Structure on Bank Performance 
4.1 Interlocking and Bank Profitability 
In this section we quantitatively examine the influence of interlocking on bank performance.  
Because the following analysis in this subsection focuses on bank profitability, and specifically the return 
on equity (ROE), as a measure for bank performance, we initially considered using a simple model for 
bank returns. There are many studies on the determinants of bank profitability that propose various 
models, according to the kinds of problems the authors were analyzing. However, most of the literature 
                              
39  Since seconded directors usually resign from the bank’s board, the director interlocking that we focus 
on in this paper is not observed in the postwar main bank system.   
40  Aoki, Sheard, and Patrick, “Main Bank”.   13
considers three factors as important determinants of bank profitability: economies of scale, the level of 
external competition, and the attitude to risk.
41  In addition to these three factors, we consider loan 
quality to be a factor affecting the profitability of a bank, because we cannot assume that loan quality was 
homogeneous among banks in pre-war Japan. Actually, it is the essence of the organ bank hypothesis that 
the quality of loans of those banks controlled by non-banking companies was low. Therefore, the baseline 
model is as follows: 
 
) , , ( i i i i i ES RISK COM LQ f ROE =           ( 1 )  
 
where LQ, COM, RISK and ES refer to the variables indicating loan quality, level of competition, attitude 
to risk, and economies of scale, respectively. We now briefly discuss these four variables, and the control 
variables used in estimation:     
(1) Loan quality (LQ).  Loan quality (loan  performance, rate of recovery of bad loans, etc.) is a 
factor that directly affects bank profitability. According to the organ bank hypothesis, banks with strong 
ties to business groups engaged in unsound lending to the related companies. To capture the organ bank 
relationship, we use the variable, INTERLOCK, which indicates the number of interlocks for each bank, 
as defined in section 3. Here, we assume that the larger the INTERLOCK value, the stronger the 
connection with the related business group. Therefore, if the organ bank hypothesis holds, the effect of 
INTERLOCK on ROE is negative. In addition, we take into account the effect of the Great Kanto 
Earthquake of 1923 on loan quality, because many banks in the South Kanto area suffered from bad loan 
                              
41  Smirlock, “Evidence”; Bouke, “Concentration”; Berger, “The Profit-Structure”; Goddard, Molyneux , 
and Wilson. European Banking; Goddard, Molyneux , and Wilson. “The Profitability”.      14
problems as a result of this natural disaster.
42 To capture this effect, we use the earthquake dummy 
variable, EQ, which takes the value, “one,” if the headquarters of the bank was located in the South 
Kanto area, i.e., Tokyo, Kanagawa, Chiba, Saitama prefectures. Accordingly, we expect the coefficient of 
EQ to be negative.         
      (2) Level of Competition (COM).  According to the standard oligopoly theory in the industry 
organization literature, banks in highly concentrated markets are able to enjoy higher interest rates 
charged on loans, and lower interest rates paid on deposits. Most studies on the determinants of bank 
profitability in the United States and Europe focus on the effects of market concentration.
43 However,  it 
should be noted that in the case of pre-war Japan the extent of competition in the banking industry 
differed by operating region
44. Therefore, it is necessary to measure the effects of market concentration 
by region. In the following analysis, we class a prefecture as a separate market. Then, in order to capture 
the effect of market concentration, we use the variable, MARKET, which is the market share of the top 
three banks, defined as their number of branch offices as a proportion of all bank branch offices in the 
prefecture.
45  The coefficient of MARKET is expected to be positive.   
(3) Attitude to risk (RISK). The attitude of banks to risk has been regarded as an important 
determinant of bank profitability.
46 If the management and shareholders of a bank are strongly 
risk-averse and maintain a high proportion of safe assets, the bank is unlikely to earn large profits, but is 
                              
42 Losses from this earthquake amounted to about 5 billion yen, which was equivalent to about 30% of 
GNP at that time (Hoshi and Kashyap, Corporate Financing). 
43 See Goddard et al. European Banking, Chapter 4, which provides a review of literature on the 
relationship between market structure and bank performance.   
44 Imuta,  “Nihon”;  Teranishi,  Nihon no Keiza Hatteni 
45 Unfortunately, we could not access information on the individual amounts of loans or deposits by 
prefecture, with respect to banks operating in multiple prefectures. Even if we replace the share of the top 
three banks with the share of the top single bank, the effect of market concentration is positive and 
statistically insignificant, as is the case if we use the share of the top three banks.       
46Bouke, “Concentration”; Berger, “The Profit-Structure”; Goddard, Molyneux , and Wilson. European 
Banking; Goddard, Molyneux , and Wilson. “The Profitability”,etc.      
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also less likely to be exposed to risk. To capture the effect of asset risk, we include the variable, 
SECURITY, which is the ratio of security holdings to assets.
47 Here, we assume that securities were 
relatively safe assets, since they were mainly government bonds and debentures issued by major 
companies. However, the indications of this coefficient are not clear a priori, because its value depends 
on the relative average returns of loans and securities. Indeed, it is quite possible that when overall 
corporate performance slowed down after the collapse of the wartime boom in 1920, the profitability of a 
bank holding more safe assets would have been higher than that of a bank holding more risky assets. 
Actually,  Hoshi  confirmed that banks forced to close in 1927 and 1930-1932 had relatively low 
proportions of security holdings.
48 It is also necessary to take into account the effect of the capital 
structure. We use the variable, LEVERAGE, indicating the financial leverage of a bank, following 
Modigliani and Miller’s PropositionⅡ, which states that the expected return on equity increases relative 
to increasing financial leverage.
49  
(4) Economies of scale (ES).  Most studies on bank profitability use bank size to capture 
economies of scale.  Because depositors were not protected by a deposit insurance system in pre-war 
Japan, large banks might have benefited from their greater credibility when it came to attracting deposits.   
To capture the effect of bank size, we use the variable, SIZE, indicating the natural log value of the bank 
assets.    If a large bank benefited from economies of scale, the coefficient of SIZE would be positive. In 
sum, the equation to be estimated is as follows: 
 
     R O E
 
i=  β0 +  β1*LN(INTERLOCKi)+β2*EQi ＋  β3*MARKETi +  β4*SECURITYi 
                              
47  Imuta,“Taishoki” confirmed that stocks accounted for only 10.9% of total security holdings on average, 
in respect of 60 banks whose data for 1925 was available. 
48  Hoshi, “Back to the Future”. 
49  See Brealey and Myers, Principles of Corporate Finance, Chapter 17.   16
+β5*SIZE i＋β6*LEVERAGE i＋εi                                   ( 2 )  
 
where LN(INTERLOCK) is the natural log value of INTERLOCK.
50  εi is the error term, and the other 
variables are as defined above. We estimated Equation (2) by the TOBIT model, as the profit data 
available from the Ministry of Finance archives were censored at zero.
51  That is, even when a bank’s 
profitability was negative, we had only value, zero.       
In addition to the estimation using full samples, we estimated Equation (2) using sub-samples 
grouped by bank size.    This is because the functions and performance of banks in pre-war Japan differed 
significantly according to size.
52  Furthermore, bank size could have been associated with the organ 
bank relationship. Shibagaki stressed that banks affiliated to major zaibatsu (Mitsui, Mitsubishi, 
Sumitomo, Yasuda), which were the largest banks, had a policy of not making substantial loans to 
companies within the same zaibatsu group.
5354  From the contributions of Imuta and Sugiyama there has 
come to be a consensus that, apart from certain exceptional periods, the banks of major zaibatsu were not 
organ banks as defined by Kato.
5556 In contrast, Teranishi  pointed out that small and medium-sized 
banks in rural areas were closely connected with regional industries, because most were established to 
                              
50 The natural log value of INTERLOCK plus one is used in the estimation, since INTERLOCK 
sometimes takes the value zero.     
51  Ministry of Finance , Ginkokyoku Nenpo, 1926 issue. 
52  This structure is sometimes called a multi-layered financial structure.See Kato, Honpo Ginkoshi 
Ron ;Imuta, “Nihon”; Teranishi, Nihon no Keizai Hatten. 
53 Shibagaki,  Nihon Kin’yu. 
54 “Zaibatsu banks” usually refer to Mitsubishi Bank, Mitsui Bank, Sumitomo Bank, and Yasuda Bank.  
We also found that all of the 19 largest banks with assets of more than one hundred million yen, including 
zaibatsu banks, had their headquarters in the urban area (Tokyo, Kanagawa, Aichi, Kyoto, Osaka, and 
Hyogo prefectures).   
55  Hoshi, “Back to the Future” found that the percentage of loans by zaibatsu banks to companies within 
the same business groups was lower than that of typical organ banks which closed during the Showa 
Financial Crisis, according to data of Mitsui, Mitsubishi and Sumitomo Banks covering the period 
1921-43. 
56  Imuta, “Taishoki”; Sugiyama, “Gomeigaisha”; Murakami, “Futsu Ginko”.   17
fund regional industry.
57 Shiratori [2001] showed that most of the banks that failed in the 1920s, due to 
improper management by the directors, were small and medium-sized banks in rural areas.    Therefore, it 
is worthwhile to estimate Equation (2) separately by bank size. This allows us to check the differences in 
effect of the organ bank relationship, and also of control variables, between la.rge banks and smaller 
banks.    The total 1,007 observations were divided into three percentile sub-samples, large, medium and 
small, as seen in Table 3.
58  Percentile criteria are preferable to criteria based on particular asset levels, 
in order to avoid arbitrariness.
59              
Table 4 presents basic statistics on the banks in our samples (Panel A), as well as on the banks 
excluded from our samples (Panel B).
60  It is difficult to quantify the sample selection bias precisely, 
because we have no information on director interlocking among excluded banks, but it is useful to have a 
comparison between the basic characteristics of our sample banks and those of the excluded banks.    As 
stated above, the data in Tokyo Koshinjo are basically limited to banks whose paid-in capital was greater 
than two hundred thousand yen.
61  Hence, banks in the samples are much larger in terms of the natural 
log of assets (SIZE) than excluded banks.  As regards profitability, the excluded banks were more 
profitable than banks in the samples, especially in terms of ROE.
62  Also, the standard deviation of 
excluded banks is extremely high compared to that of the banks in the samples. This is consistent with 
Teranishi , who noted that, because smaller banks frequently made unsecured loans or loans based on real 
                              
57 Teranishi,  Nihon no Keizai. 
58  Alternatively, we could have checked the difference in effects of director interlocking by bank size, by 
adding the interaction term, SIZE*INTERLOCK to Equation (2). However, this formulation is more 
restrictive, because it assumes a linear relationship between the marginal effect of director interlocking on 
bank profitability and bank size.   
59  In addition to the sub-sample analyses by bank size, we also conducted several tests, distinguishing 
urban areas from rural areas.    However, since the differences in the estimated results of sub-sample 
analyses by area were not as pronounced as those by bank size, we report only the latter in the table. 
60  As for the definition of the variables, see Appendix Table 3. 
61 Tokyo  Koshinjo,  Ginko Kaisha Youroku, 1926 issue. 
62  Here, we regard the value of ROE as zero, if a bank’s profit is censored at zero.   18
estate to their customers, their profit structures tended to be high risk/high return.    It should be noted that 
in the case of left censored data, the expected value of a sample with high variance is statistically higher 
than that of a sample with low variance, even if they have the same mean.
63    Therefore, we cannot rule 
out the possibility that the higher ROE of excluded banks is due to left censoring, given that the variance 
in ROE of the excluded banks is higher than that of the banks in the samples.    In respect of most of the 
other variables, we cannot statistically reject the null hypothesis that the banks in the samples equal the 
excluded banks.
64    In sum, at least there is no strong evidence that our sample selection is pre-biased in 
order to lend weight to the organ bank hypothesis.
65  
Table 5 presents the estimation results of Equation (2). Columns 1 and 2 report the results for the 
full samples.    It can be confirmed from Column 1 that the coefficient of LN(INTERLOCK) is negative 
and statistically significant, indicating that director interlocking between banks and non-banking 
companies had a negative effect on bank profitability. The positive coefficient of SIZE implies the 
economies of scale. As we expected, the earthquake dummy (EQ) had a negative effect on bank 
profitability. The effect of market concentration (MARKET) is positive, as standard oligopoly theory 
predicts, but its statistical significance is not high.  Finally, banks that ranked higher on proportion of 
security holdings were more profitable. One interpretation is that this reflects the low return on loans due 
to the poor performance of industrial companies during the long depression that followed World War I.   
In Column 2, we include the variable of LEVERAGE. The coefficient of LN(INTERLOCK) still 
showed a strong negative effect on bank profitability. Consistent with MM’s proposition Ⅱ, the 
                              
63 See Green Econometric Analysis, Chapter 20. It is shown that the expected value of a left (right) 
censored variable increases (decreases) with its variance.       
64 We conducted both t-test and Wilcoxon rank sum test. In both tests, SECURITY is statistically not 
equal between banks in the samples and excluded banks.       
65 We estimated Equation (2) by sample selection model, where the selection equation included SIZE, 
SECURITY and area dummies. Then, it was confirmed that the results were fairly similar to those of the 
baseline analysis (Table 5).     19
coefficient of LEVERAGE is positive. Alternatively, this positive effect could be explained by 
differences in individual funding costs of deposits, given that high financial leverage reflects strong 
ability to attract deposits. Actually, it is noted that banks that were less able to attract deposits offered 
higher interest rates on deposits, in order to prevent an outflow of their existing deposits.
66  On the other 
hand, the positive effect of bank size is no longer significant.  This may be because LEVERAGE is 
highly correlated with SIZE (ρ=0.49).    Hence, it is likely that LEVERAGE partially absorbs the effect 
of bank size. As for other variables, the estimated results are qualitatively the same as those of Column 1.     
These results support the organ bank hypothesis.  From the coefficient of LN(INTERLOCK) in 
column [2] and the average number of interlocks in Table 3, we can calculate that director interlocking 
lowered the ROE of a bank by 1.66% on average.
67  Interlocked directors tended to make a bank lend to 
the related firms beyond proper financial judgement, as in the cases we saw in the previous section, and 
consequently lowered the bank profitability
68.   
Now, we discuss the estimated results for three sub-samples, grouped by bank size. The results for 
smaller banks (0-33.3 percentile), medium-sized banks (33.3-66.7 percentile), and large banks (66.7-100
 
percentile) are reported in Columns 3-4, 5-6, and 7-8, respectively. The coefficient of LN(INTERLOCK) 
is negative and statistically significant for smaller and medium-sized banks. On the other hand, director 
interlocking had no significant effect on large banks. Furthermore, the magnitude of the effect is 
substantially greater for the smaller and medium-sized banks than for the large banks. These results 
indicate that the unfavourable nature of director interlocking with non-banking companies was specific to 
                              
66Teranishi, Nihon no Keizai Hatten. 
67  It is calculated from the difference of the predicted values when the value of INTERLOCK is changed 
from zero to mean, evaluated at the means of the other variables .             
68  We conducted a multivariate outlier test (Hadi, "Identifying”), and identified 22 outliers. After 
eliminating these outliers, the estimated results indicated that the negative effect of INTERLOCK was 
slightly attenuated, but still statistically significant at the 5% or 1% levels, while the effects of other 
variables were not substantially changed.   20
medium-sized and smaller banks.
69  
Finally, we address some problems potential to the above results to check the robustness.    First, it 
is possible that non-banking companies might have seconded directors and auditors to poor-performing 
banks in an attempt to rescue and restructure them.
70 However, none of the many case studies of organ 
banks report that non-banking companies seconded directors and auditors to banks in order to rescue 
them. Bank of Japan reports the histories, from establishment to bankruptcy, of the twenty banks that 
closed during the Showa Financial Crisis.
71 Twelve of the twenty banks failed due more or less to 
unsound loans related to their directors, and that in none of these twelve cases had the related 
non-banking companies seconded directors to those banks when their performance changed for the 
worse.
72   
Second, it is useful to check the results using alternative measures of director interlocking. In the 
previous analyses, we used the number of director interlocks (INTERLOCK), i.e., the total number of 
director or auditor positions held in non-banking companies by the directors and auditors of each bank, as 
a proxy of the strength of connection between banks and companies.  Here, we consider two other 
proxies.  The first candidate is the number of non-banking companies related to each bank via director 
                              
69  Alternatively, we can add the interaction term of INTERLOCK and SIZE in Equation (2), in order to 
examine the relationship between the effect of director interlocking and bank size. If, as bank size 
increased, the negative effect of director interlocking were attenuated, the coefficient of the interaction 
term should be positive. The estimated results indicate that the coefficient of INTERLOCK*SIZE was 
positive in all specifications, but statistically insignificant in some cases. Therefore, it is likely that bank 
size had some relationship to the nature of director interlocking, but the continuous relationship is not 
robust. Furthermore, we re-estimated Equation (2), adding the square of INTERLOCK to account for 
potential non-monotonicity. We found that the relation between ROE and INTERLOCK was U-shaped 
(decreasing for low values of INTERLOCK and increasing for relatively high values of INTERLOCK). 
However, this relationship disappeared when we added the interaction term, INTERLOCK*SIZE.   
70  In other words, director interlocking might be endogenous. Taking this possibility into account, we 
conducted two stage estimation of Equation (2). See Appendix . 
71  Bnak of Japan, “Sho Kyugyo”. 
72  Shibuya, “Ginko Jiko” investigated the causes of 213 bank failures in the period 1910-15, using Ginko 
Jiko Shirabe ( Investigation into Bank Accidents) by the Ministry of Finance. According to 
Shibuya,“Ginko Jiko”, one fourth of those bank failures were related to unsound activities by the 
directors of the banks.   21
interlocking (FIRM). The second candidate is the number of interlocks per director (INTDIRC), which 
means that we normalized the number of interlocks by the total number of directors.
73 Table 6a, 6b 
reports the estimated results of Equation (2) using these two other proxies in place of LN(INTERLOCK). 
Panel A reports the results of estimation when we replaced LN(INTERLOCK) by the natural log of 
FIRM (LN(FIRM)).
74 It shows that the results are qualitatively the same as those for the baseline 
regressions.
75  
4.2 Interlocking and bank closure 
Next, we focus on evaluation of banks in the financial market.  As stock price data are available 
for only a small number of banks, we use the data on bank runs and closures, which were analyzed by 
Yabushita and Inoue.
76 They proposed a simple model in which the probability of closure principally 
increased with a fall in the net liquidity position of a bank.  Using this model, they investigated the 
relationship between individual banks’ financial positions and the probability of closure during the 
Showa Financial Crisis. They confirmed the fundamental bank runs view that the poor performance of 
bank portfolios increased the probability of closure due to bank runs.
7778 Based on their model, we 
estimate the cumulative distribution function F of the probability of bank runs by the LOGIT model.
79 
 
                              
73  We also ran regressions using the number of interlocks normalized by bank assets and the natural log 
of bank assets, and confirmed that the effects of these two variables were still negative and statistically 
significant at the 5% level or the 1% level.   
74  In estimation, we used LN(FIRM+1). 
75  We also estimated equation (2), substituting ROA (the ratio of profit to total deposit plus the book 
value of capital) and the loan deposit ratio for ROE. LN(INTERLOCK) had a negative effect on ROA 
and a positive effect on loan-deposit ratios.   
76  Yabushita and Inoue, “The Stability”. 
77  Gorton, “Bank Suspension.” 
78  During the Showa Financial Crisis, two waves of bank runs occurred. Korenaga, Nagase, and 
Teranishi. “1927 nen” foundthat bank runs in the first wave were information-based but that the second 
was triggered by self-fulfilling beliefs of depositors, using the data of deposit growth. However, with 
respect to bank closures, they could not provide evidence of self-fulfilling bank runs. 
79  We also conducted ordered LOGIT regressions, considering the possibility that a closure was worse 
than a run. The result was similar to that in Table 7.   22
    P r o b ( R C i) = F[β0 +  β1*LN(INTERLOCKi) + β2*EQ + β3LN(ASSETi)  β4*CAPDEPOi  + 
β5*RESDEPOi +  β6*LOANDEPOi ＋  β7*ROEi ]                 ( 3 )  
 
The dependent variable, RC, is a dummy variable, which equals 1 if the bank was closed or faced with a 
run in the period 1927-29, or zero, otherwise.
80 The information on bank closures and runs was from 
various issues of Ginko Jiko Geppo (Monthly Report on Bank Issues) by the Bank of Japan, reprinted in 
the Bank of Japan.
81  
CAPDEPO is defined as the book value of capital divided by total deposits. A high value for this 
ratio means that the ratio of liability exposed to withdrawal by depositors is low. Hence, we expect that 
CAPDEPO would have negative effects on the probability of a run or closure. RESDEPO and 
LOANDEPO are defined as bank deposit reserves, and total loans divided by total deposits, respectively.  
These two ratios are directly related to the liquidity position of a bank. If a bank has sufficient bank 
deposit reserves, it is unlikely to be faced with a run or closure, because it can accommodate withdrawal 
demands by depositors. On the other hand, because it is not easy to liquidate bank loans immediately, a 
bank with a high LOANDEPO is likely to be exposed to a run or closure even in the event of minor 
liquidity shocks.   
The other independent variables are the same as those defined in Section 4.1. A bank with a high 
value of ROE is unlikely to be exposed to a run or closure. SIZE and EQ are included to control the credit 
risk factor, which could increase a bank’s probability of a run or closure. The larger the bank, the more 
likely it is to diversify its loan portfolio or be able to withstand certain negative shocks. Therefore, large 
                              
80  Unlike Yabushita and Inoue, “The Stability”, we focused not only on bank closures during the Showa 
Financial Crisis in 1927, but also on bank closures and runs in ordinary years (1928 and 1929), in order to 
obtain a broad perspective on evaluation of the financial market. 
81  Bank of Japan. “Ginko Jiko Geppo”.   23
banks are generally considered to have low credit risk, compared to smaller banks. As for EQ, banks 
operating in the area damaged by the Great Kanto Earthquake in 1923 were expected to suffer from bad 
loan problems. Hence, such banks were considered to have high credit risk. In sum, we predicted that the 
coefficient of SIZE would be negative and that of EQ would be positive
82. Finally, LN(INTERLOCK) 
was included to test the organ bank hypothesis.    If the market perceived director interlocking between a 
bank and companies as unfavourable, the coefficient of LN(INTERLOCK) would be positive. 
Table 7 reports the results of the LOGIT estimation. Columns 1 and 2 are the results for all banks.   
In Column 1, the coefficient of LN(INTERLOCK) is positive but not significant. Furthermore, Column 2 
shows that this coefficient is positive but statistically insignificant, after we adjust for the four financial 
ratios. Therefore, in respect of all banks, we could not obtain strong evidence that the market negatively 
assessed the connection of banks with non-banking companies. As for other control variables, whereas 
the coefficient of SIZE is positive in Column 1, this positive effect disappears after adjusting for financial 
ratios (Column 2).  EQ shows no significant effect.  On the other hand, the indications of all the 
coefficients of the financial ratios were as expected, and the coefficients of CAPDEPO and LOANDEPO 
were statistically significant.  These results imply that, basically, the financial position of a bank better 
explains the probability of closure or a run than other factors, which is consistent with Yabushita and 
Inoue.
83 
Columns 3 and 4 report the results for smaller banks.  In Column 3, it is confirmed that the 
coefficient of LN(INTERLOCK) is positive and statistically significant.  Also, the magnitude is much 
greater compared with that of Column 1.    In Column 4, the positive effect of LN(INTERLOCK) is still 
significant after adjusting for financial ratios.  These results indicate that, for smaller banks, director 
                              
82  Yabushita and Inoue “The Stability” used the Tokyo area dummy instead of EQ. However, the Tokyo 
area dummy was positive but statistically insignificant in cases where we substitute it for EQ.     
83  Yabushita and Inoue “The Stability”.   24
interlocking was evaluated as negative information by the market, in addition to poor financial position.  
On the other hand, it is confirmed in Columns 5-8 that director interlocking had no effect on the 
probability of closure or a run in respect of medium-sized and large banks.    In sum, the finding that the 
effects of director interlocking were harmful to smaller banks, but to larger banks, is still robust, even if 
we use probability of closure or a run as a performance measure.     
 
  5. Concluding remarks 
More than forty years ago, Kato proposed the organ bank hypothesis: that in pre-war Japan many 
banks controlled by industrial companies through capital and personal relationships, engaged in unsound 
lending to their related companies, which damaged the banks’ financial positions, and consequently 
destabilized the financial system.
84  This view has become one of the fundamental hypotheses on 
Japanese financial history, but has not been examined quantitatively.   
In this paper, we examined the organ bank hypothesis, using the data on director interlocking 
between banks and non-banking companies.  We found that more than 80% of ordinary banks had at 
least one director or auditor who was also a director or auditor of a non-banking company.  Also, 
through regression analyses, we confirmed that director interlocking had negative effects on bank 
performance, and that these effects were serious, especially for smaller banks.    Our findings support the 
organ bank hypothesis.   
As stated in section 1, the organ bank relationship can be regarded as a case of related lending 
suffered from “looting,” which is widely observed in present developing countries.
85 This perception 
leads us to an interesting future research topic.  That is the fate of the organ bank relationship in the 
                              
84 Kato, Honpo Ginkoshi Ron. 
85  La Porta, Rafel, Lopez-Silanes, and Zamarrip, “Related Lending.”   25
process of economic and financial development.  Did the organ bank relationship disappear after the 
1920s?  If so, how did that come about?  One hypothesis we have in mind is a “natural selection” 
hypothesis.
86    Given that the organ bank relationship compromised the soundness of bank loans, we can 
expect that organ banks would be more likely to be forced out of the market than other banks.    In other 
words, if the mechanism of selection by market forces was effective, surviving banks would be expected 
to demonstrate fewer characteristics of organ banks.    Because there were many banks in pre-war Japan, 
this is a good opportunity to examine whether such “natural selection” actually worked or not, which 
would have a substantial implication to understand the evolution of institutions.    At the same time, if the 
natural selection did not work effectively, it might imply that some government regulation on related 
rending is needed in present developing countries.  These issues remain to be addressed by future 
studies. 
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Appendix : Two stage estimation of Equation (2) 
In order to deal with the potential endogeneity, we estimated Equation (2) by two stage least square 
method, using the age of a bank and the prefecture dummies as instrumental variables for INTERLOCK.   
The basic idea is that since an organ bank was, by definition, established to fund related non-banking 
companies, arguably an organ bank in its early stages would have been firmly controlled by its founders, 
who were bank directors. Then, as the banks matured, the influence of the founders generally would be 
attenuated, as compared with the early stage situation.
87 Hence, bank age was expected to have a 
negative effect on INTERLOCK. In respect of prefecture dummies, we considered that director 
interlocking between banks and non-banking companies was affected to greater or lesser extent by the 
structures of individual regional economies.
88  In the first stage, INTERLOCK was regressed on bank age 
                              
87 Morikawa,  Nihon Keieishi defined a professional manager as a manager who was not a major 
shareholder of the company where he worked, but was expected to play only a management role, and 
investigated the ratio of professional managers among the board members, in respect of large companies, 
including banks, in 1905, 1912 and 1930. According to his calculations, the number of professional 
managers gradually increased during this period. 
88  According to Shiratori, Shiratori, “1920 Nendai”, the reason for the Bank Law of 1927 not completely   32
and prefecture dummies and other exogenous variables by OLS. The coefficient of bank age was 
negative and statistically significant. In the second stage, we estimated Equation (2), using the result of 
the first stage regression.
89 Appendix Table 2 reports the results of the second stage regressions.  In 
respect of the results for all banks (Columns 1 and 2), the coefficients of LN(INTERLOCK) are still 




                                                                                   
prohibiting director interlocking between banks and companies was that the government took account of 
the situation in some rural areas, where it was unavoidable that some powerful and reputable persons held 
directorships in banks as well as in non-banking companies.     
89  In the second stage estimation of tobit model, we use the asymptotically efficient estimator proposed 
by Newey, “Efficient Estimation”. Table1 Distribution of the number of directors of the sample banks
Number of directors
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16～Total
Total number of directors 0 9 3 5 30 75 97 146 189 142 115 75 35 21 21 14 30 1007
Top executive 94 891 20 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1007
Executive directors 523 362 91 22 6 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1007
Ordinary directors 18 41 128 214 241 157 103 47 25 12 6 8 4 0 1 1 1 1007
Auditors 17 69 321 389 120 63 20 5 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1007
Source: Our data base (see the text).Panel A: ALL directors and auditors of 1007 banks
Total 836 83.0 7,314 7.26
Top executive 407 40.4 962 0.96
Executive directors 157 15.6 205 0.20
Ordinary directors 753 74.8 4,160 4.13
Auditors 637 63.3 1,987 1.97
Panel B: Top executives of 1007 banks
Total 483 48.0 1,486 1.48
Top executive 175 17.4 283 0.28
Executive directors 26 2.6 29 0.03
Ordinary directors 364 36.1 841 0.84
Auditors 203 20.2 333 0.33
Panel C: Executive directors of 1007 banks
Total 205 20.4 524 0.52
Top executive 30 3.0 44 0.04
Executive directors 16 1.6 19 0.02
Ordinary directors 149 14.8 279 0.28
Auditors 115 11.4 182 0.18
Panel D: Ordinary directors of 1007 banks
Total 690 68.5 3,509 3.48
Top executive 238 23.6 426 0.42
Executive directors 80 7.9 94 0.09
Ordinary directors 588 58.4 2,078 2.06
Auditors 424 42.1 911 0.90
Panel E: Auditors of 1007 banks
Total 525 52.1 1,795 1.78
Top executive 131 13.0 209 0.21
Executive directors 56 5.6 63 0.06
Ordinary directors 419 41.6 962 0.96
Auditors 302 30.0 561 0.56
Source: Our database (see the text). 
Average per
bank
Table 2 Interlocking of directors and auditors between banks and non-banking companies







interlocksTotal Total 1,007 836 83.0 7.26
Small-sized  335 235 70.1 3.27
Medium-sized  336 278 82.7 4.82
Large-sized  336 323 96.1 13.70
Top executive Total 1,007 407 40.4 0.96
Small-sized  335 67 20.0 0.36
Medium-sized  336 112 33.3 0.51
Large-sized  336 228 67.9 2.00
Executive directors Total 1,007 158 15.7 0.20
Small-sized  335 23 6.9 0.08
Medium-sized  336 41 12.2 0.14
Large-sized  336 93 27.7 0.39
Ordinary directors Total 1,007 753 74.8 4.13
Small-sized  335 193 57.6 1.85
Medium-sized  336 256 76.2 2.94
Large-sized  336 304 90.5 7.59
Auditors Total 1,007 637 63.3 1.97
Small-sized  335 165 49.3 0.97
Medium-sized  336 192 57.1 1.23
Large-sized  336 280 83.3 3.72
Source: Our database (see the text). 
Table 3 Interlocking of directors and auditors between banks and non-banking companies by scale of
banks
Positions in the non-








PanelA Banks in the sample
Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ROE 1,007 13.28 7.92 0.00 73.22
LOANDEPO 1,007 2.11 11.13 0.00 310.45
CAPDEPO 1,007 1.04 7.06 0.04 195.10
RESDEPO 1,007 0.20 1.65 0.00 52.14
LEVARAGE 1,007 3.03 2.77 0.01 27.75
SECURITY 1,007 0.11 0.15 0.00 1.87
MARKET 1,007 29.6 13.8 11.3 100.0
KANTO 1,007 0.1 0.4 0.0 1.0
URBAN 1,007 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00
AGE 1,007 26.72 11.56 0.00 53.00
SIZE 1,007 14.75 1.36 10.95 20.46
INTERLOCK 1,007 7.26 10.00 0.00 88.00
FIRM 1,007 5.59 7.70 0.00 66.00
INTDIRC 1,007 0.84 1.05 0.00 7.44
PanelB Banks excluded from the sample
Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ROE 391 16.07 12.36 0.00 83.09
LOANDEPO 391 2.01 6.95 0.00 131.81
CAPDEPO 391 2.06 13.41 0.01 182.46
RESDEPO 391 0.58 7.17 0.00 141.22
LEVARAGE 391 3.70 7.57 0.01 122.78
SECURITY 391 0.08 0.11 0.00 0.76
MARKET 391 28.11 13.84 11.31 94.59
KANTO 391 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00
URBAN 391 0.25 0.44 0.00 1.00
AGE 389 29.04 8.02 0.00 52.00
SIZE 391 12.94 1.03 9.93 16.66
Source: Ministry of Finance[1926].Table5 Baseline regression results
Dependent variable: ROE
Bank Size
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
LN(INTERLOCK) -1.2689 a -1.0569 a -1.533 a -1.3159 b -1.3229 a -1.0989 a -0.6336 -0.3449
(0.3205) (0.3162) (0.5814) (0.5844) (0.4273) (0.4173) (0.63) (0.6147)
SIZE 1.0654 a 0.283 4.2841 a 2.451 b 0.5009 -1.0393 0.1077 -0.3337
(0.2373) (0.2595) (1.1065) (1.2462) (1.2268) (1.1554) (0.4689) (0.4864)
EQ -3.255 a -3.455 a -4.9466 a -4.9019 a -2.411 c -2.2545 c -1.7702 -2.4742
(0.8557) (0.8342) (1.6364) (1.6181) (1.2432) (1.2045) (1.6054) (1.5322)
MARKET 0.0289 0.0141 0.1032 b 0.0806 -0.0358 -0.036 0.0292 0.0059
(0.0243) (0.0223) (0.0502) (0.0508) (0.0292) (0.0286) (0.0435) (0.0363)
SECURITY 6.4584 a 7.0533 a 8.0673 a 8.4407 a 3.0993 3.155 6.0402 7.0559
(2.0859) (2.08) (2.4776) (2.4133) (3.1421) (2.9457) (4.4493) (4.4403)
LEVARAGE 0.6877 a 1.6185 a 0.8192 a 0.5542 a
(0.1519) (0.5488) (0.2083) (0.1975)
INTERCEPT -1.7845 7.7472 -47.281 a -24.748 9.0704 28.8047 c 12.0082 16.6261 b
(3.3631) (3.4345) (15.2358) (16.6949) (17.5915) (16.693) (7.4171) (7.234)
Log likelihood -3395.45 -3374.97 -1096.8 -1091.2 -1072.2 -1060.5 -1185.67 -1178.44
NOB 1007 1007 335 335 336 336 336 336
Censored 64 64 41 41 9 9 14 14
Notes: Significance at 1%,5% and 10% level are denoted by "a" "b" and "c". The figures in parentheses are the White
heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. Significance levels are reported for two-tailed tests. Definitions of the variables
can be found in the appendix.
All banks Small-sized banks Medium-sized banks Large-sized banksTable6 Test of other proxies for connection between banks and firms
Panel A: Number of firms connected with bank through director interlocking 
Dependent variable: ROE
Bank Size
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
LN(FIRM) -1.6491 a -1.4059 a -1.693 a -1.4463 b -1.7785 a -1.4844 a -1.1339 -0.8364
(0.3727) (0.369) (0.641) (0.6453) (0.478) (0.4667) (0.7796) (0.7695)
SIZE 1.1785 a 0.4015 4.2262 a 2.4047 c 0.7957 -0.7501 0.3131 -0.1226
(0.2497) (0.2742) (1.102) (1.2404) (1.2265) (1.159) (0.4848) (0.5037)
EQ -3.236 a -3.4352 a -4.9434 a -4.9005 a -2.4844 b -2.32 c -1.7213 -2.4175
(0.8529) (0.8309) (1.6349) (1.6181) (1.2425) (1.2048) (1.5949) (1.5147)
MARKET 0.0296 0.015 0.1041 b 0.0814 -0.0365 -0.0366 0.0315 0.0088
(0.0242) (0.0221) (0.0503) (0.0509) (0.0288) (0.0283) (0.0429) (0.0356)
SECURITY 6.5298 a 7.1083 a 8.1946 a 8.5477 a 3.2584 3.287 6.1341 7.1604
(2.0966) (2.0861) (2.4693) (2.4034) (3.1068) (2.9117) (4.473) (4.4579)
LEVARAGE 0.6767 a 1.6137 a 0.7959 a 0.5423 a
(0.153) (0.5502) (0.211) (0.1999)
INTERCEPT -3.1433 6.326 c -46.5331 a -24.1525 5.1452 24.9747 9.4808 14.0845 b
(3.466) (3.5704) (15.189) (16.6294) (17.5623) (16.7084) (7.3274) (7.1518)
Log likelihood -3392.11 -3372.18 -1096.77 -1091.18 -1069.92 -1058.78 -1184.76 -1177.79
NOB 1007 1007 335 335 336 336 336 336
Censored 64 64 41 41 9 9 14 14
Notes: Significance at 1%,5% and 10% level are denoted by "a" "b" and "c". The figures in parentheses are White
heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. Significance levels are reported for two-tailed tests. Definitions of the variables
can be found in the appendix.
All banks Small-sized banks Medium-sized banks Large-sized banksTable6 Test of other proxies for connection between banks and firms
Panel B  Number of interlocks per director
Dependent variable: ROE
Bank Size
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
INTDIRC -0.9367 a -0.8711 a -2.1622 a -2.0098 a -0.7515 -0.5299 -0.4312 -0.4601
(0.2921) (0.2668) (0.5329) (0.5486) (0.4798) (0.4648) (0.4252) (0.3871)
SIZE 0.8471 a 0.106 4.0769 a 2.2657 c 0.1295 -1.4639 0.0233 -0.288
(0.2196) (0.2359) (1.1083) (1.2375) (1.2818) (1.2067) (0.4413) (0.4465)
EQ -2.9737 a -3.2016 a -4.7794 a -4.7385 a -1.927 -1.8864 -1.6858 -2.3862
(0.8539) (0.8336) (1.6091) (1.5928) (1.2121) (1.1732) (1.6055) (1.5328)
MARKET 0.0223 0.0081 0.1042 b 0.0813 -0.046 -0.0446 0.0246 0.0024
(0.024) (0.0219) (0.0501) (0.0504) (0.0291) (0.0283) (0.0428) (0.0359)
SECURITY 6.7917 a 7.4093 a 9.503 a 9.7988 a 3.3148 3.3559 6.1367 7.3471 c
(2.0815) (2.0672) (2.7444) (2.5807) (3.2707) (3.0682) (4.4539) (4.4431)
LEVARAGE 0.7166 a 1.6512 a 0.8558 a 0.5667 a
(0.1515) (0.5365) (0.2077) (0.1975)
INTERCEPT 0.3469 9.4457 a -45.2678 a -22.9128 13.2998 33.8482 c 12.6696 c 15.7531 b
(3.238) (3.2428) (15.2477) (16.6028) (18.3715) (17.4279) (7.3966) (7.1379)
Log likelihood -3398.72 -3376.336 -1095.35 -1089.38 -1076.38 -1063.79 -1185.71 -1178.02
NOB 1007 1007 335 335 336 336 336 336
Censored 64 64 41 41 9 9 14 14
Notes: Significance at 1%,5% and 10% level are denoted by "a" "b" and "c". The figures in parentheses are White
heteroscedasticity robust standard errors.  Significance levels are reported for two-tailed tests. Definitions of the variables
can be found in the appendix.
All banks Small-sized banks Medium-sized banks Large-sized banksTable7 Determinants of bank runs or closures in 1927-1929
Bank Size
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
LN(INTERLOCK) 0.1894 0.2229 0.8522 c 0.7079 c -0.009 0.0023 0.1335 0.1848
(0.1794) (0.178) (0.4397) (0.3908) (0.2881) (0.324) (0.2327) (0.2375)
SIZE 0.3581 a 0.1455 -0.2906 -0.4145 1.3116 0.8281 0.1202 -0.025
(0.1107) (0.1205) (0.9116) (0.8884) (0.8105) (0.8486) (0.1702) (0.1878)
EQ 0.3001 0.3384 0.3408 0.0248 0.5508 0.5568 0.2748 0.2515
(0.331) (0.3397) (1.1403) (0.9417) (0.5969) (0.7372) (0.3972) (0.4198)
CAPDEPO -2.3687 a -1.4155 c -2.9971 a -3.0579 a
(0.7884) (0.8454) (0.9519) (1.1041)
LOANDEPO 0.0741 b 0.2951 b 0.0786 b 0.0819 c
(0.0292) (0.1268) (0.0367) (0.0494)
RESDEPO -1.0164 2.8106 -0.1051 -4.1358 b
(1.6613) (2.2384) (2.3658) (2.0337)
ROE -0.0335 -0.1407 a -0.0529 -0.0154
(0.0297) (0.0524) (0.0665) (0.0302)
INTERCEPT -8.4469 a -3.8038 b -1.2971 2.191 -22.0859 c -13.1694 -4.2284 c -0.5059
(1.4502) (1.6987) (11.9144) (11.7678) (11.7577) (12.3022) (2.4847) (2.7993)
Pseudo 0.0689 0.1107 0.0609 0.1959 0.021 0.0791 0.0112 0.0616
Log likelihood -231.778 -221.369 -28.2488 -24.1885 -68.7132 -64.6369 -128.968 -122.402
NOB 1007 1007 335 335 336 336 336 336
Notes: Significance at 1%,5% and 10% level are denoted by "a" "b" and "c". The figures in parentheses are White
heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. Significance levels are reported for two-tail tests. Definitions of the variables can be
found in the appendix.
All banks Small-sized banks Medium-sized banks Large-sized banksAppendix Table 1 Characteristics of loans of the closed banks under the Showa Financial Crisis in 1927
Panel A: Size of the loans to related borrowers
Bank Name Capital Assets
(million Yen) (million Yen)
Imabari Shogyo  2.50 17.5 4,957 17,270 28.7%
Tokushima  0.70 8.6 1,092 2,694 40.6%
Tokyo Watanabe  2.00 40.4 35,045 47,457 73.8%
Nakai  5.00 53.0 8,072 41,423 19.5%
Murai  5.13 68.6 16,293 63,214 25.8%
Souda  2.50 24.2 9,544 23,668 40.3%
Nakazawa  1.25 10.3 11,509 12,176 94.5%
Hachijuyon  2.30 20.9 3,296 17,441 18.9%
Toukatsu  0.40 2.4 415 1,372 30.2%
Dai Rokujugo  6.25 36.3 8,260 29,166 28.3%
Kurita  0.80 7.5 1,209 5,920 20.4%
Oumi  9.38 147.2 10,017 130,560 7.7%
Nishi Ehara  0.40 3.1 440 2,679 16.4%
Jugo  49.75 450.6 141,786 396,049 35.8%
Kasen 0.25 2.1 805 1,642 49.0%
Panel B: Comparison of  loan terms between related loans and all loans
(2) All loans  Unsecured Ratio(%)
Bank Name
Imabari Shogyo  3,566 4,435 8,378 17,270 80.4% 48.5%
Tokushima  - - - - - -
Tokyo Watanabe  - - - - - -
Nakai  - - - - - -
Murai  - - - - - -
Souda  7,324 9,544 16,512 23,668 76.7% 69.8%
Nakazawa  10,158 11,509 10,378 12,176 88.3% 85.2%
Hachijuyon  - - - - - -
Toukatsu  396 415 934 1,372 95.5% 68.1%
Dai Rokujugo  - - - - - -
Kurita  751 1,209 1,718 5,920 62.1% 29.0%
Oumi  - - - - - -
Nishi Ehara  400 440 1,021 2,679 90.9% 38.1%
Jugo  - - - - - -
Kasen - - - - - -
Total 22,596 27,551 38,941 63,085 82.0% 61.7%
Panel C: Comparison of loan performance between relate loans and all loans
(2) All loans  Irrevocable Ratio(%)
Bank Name
Imabari Shogyo  1,978 5,636 4,122 17,270 35.1% 23.9%
Tokushima  352 832 1,127 2,694 42.3% 41.8%
Tokyo Watanabe  - - - - - -
Nakai  - - - - - -
Murai  13,383 16,293 36,820 63,213 82.1% 58.2%
Souda  8,206 9,544 16,263 23,668 86.0% 68.7%
Nakazawa  10,896 11,509 11,032 12,176 94.7% 90.6%
Hachijuyon  3,096 3,296 8,957 17,441 93.9% 51.4%
Toukatsu  - - - - - -
Dai Rokujugo  - - - - - -
Kurita  - - - - - -
Oumi  - - - - - -
Nishi Ehara  - - - - - -
Jugo  - - - - - -
Kasen 445 804 489 1,642 55.3% 29.8%
Total 38,356 47,914 78,811 138,104 80.1% 57.1%
Source: Bank of Japan[1964] and Teranishi[1982].
Unit of loans: Thousand Yen
(1)Loans to























(2)All loans Ratio of loans to
related borrowers
(1)Loans to related
borrowersAppendix Table 2 2SLS regression results
Dependent variable: ROE
Bank Size
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
LN(INTERLOCK) -2.0006 b -1.9094 b -4.3484 a -3.4719 a -1.0846 -1.1396 -0.3331 0.6067
(0.8944) (0.8845) (1.2497) (1.2163) (2.3873) (5.0504) (1.9969) (2.3072)
SIZE 1.3846 a 0.6861 5.8573 a 4.2115 a 0.658 0.6897 0.1113 -0.332
(0.4419) (0.4766) (1.1342) (1.2712) (3.3524) (7.7504) (0.9778) (1.1808)
EQ -3.2228 a -3.4035 a -4.5511 a -4.5526 a 4.8289 5.0488 5.3644 7.1219 c
(0.7612) (0.7392) (1.4726) (1.4639) (3.6603) (5.9221) (3.7639) (3.9501)
MARKET 0.0332 c 0.0197 0.0845 b 0.0659 c -3.0867 b -2.3849 c -1.6774 -2.418
(0.0197) (0.0194) (0.0375) (0.0379) (1.3166) (1.299) (1.8345) (1.8795)
SECURITY 6.5589 a 7.1368 a 8.5491 a 8.6969 a -2.8169 -0.0718 0.084 0.1479
(1.7844) (1.731) (3.1905) (3.1745) (6.3197) (14.0578) (3.4839) (4.1831)
LEVARAGE 0.6551 a 1.217 b -1.3743 -0.2361
(0.1077) (0.4705) (1.0078) (0.6701)
INTERCEPT -5.4726 3.0745 -65.1718 a -45.2944 a 0.7505 0.6872 9.3543 14.0758
(5.4242) (5.8237) (14.9189) (16.4435) (47.3908) (109.0543) (12.6532) (15.2664)
NOB 1007 1007 335 335 336 336 336 336
Censored 64 64 41 41 9 9 14 14
Notes: Significance at 1%,5% and 10% level are denoted by "a" "b" and "c". The figures in parentheses are standard errors
proposed by Newey(1987).  Significance levels are reported for two-tailed tests. Definitions of the other variables can be
found in the appendix.

















Ratio of the book value of capital to total deposits.
Ratio of security holdings to total deposit plus the book value of capital.
Ratio of total deposits to the book value of capital. Capital is the sum of paid-in
capital, reserved fund and profit
Ratio of bank deposit reserve to total deposits.
Number of interlocks. That is, the total number of the positions of directors and
auditors of non-banking companies, held by the directors and auditors of each
bank.
1926 minus the year when the bank was established.
Number of the non-banking firms connected with the bank through director
interlocking.
Number of interlocks per director. That is, INTERLOCK divided by the number
of directors.
Natural log value of total deposit plus the book value of capital. Capital is the
sum of paid-in capital, reserved fund and profit
Dummy variable which equals 1, if the bank’s head office was located in Tokyo,
Kanagawa, Aichi, Osaka, Kyoto, or Hyogo prefecture, and 0, otherwise.
Dummy variable which equals 1, if the bank’s head office was located in Tokyo,
Kanagawa, Chiba, or Saitama prefecture, and 0, otherwise.
Dummy variable which equals to 1, if the bank was closed or faced with run in
1927-1929, and 0 otherwise.
Ratio of profit to the book value of capital. The profit is equal to the profito f
the second half of the fiscal year, multiplied by two. Capital is the sum of paid-
in capital, reserved fund and profit
Share of top three banks in term of the number of branch offices in each
prefecture.